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I. INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, October 21, 1989, TAN-SAHSA airlines flight
414 took off from San Jos6, Costa Rica.' After a stop in
Managua, Nicaragua, the Boeing 727 headed for Tegucigalpa,
Honduras.2 The jet, owned by Continental Airlines and leased to
TAN-SAHSA, 3 crashed on its final approach to Tegucigalpa's
Toncontin Airport at about 7:30 A.M. local time.4 One hundred
thirty-one passengers were killed, making it the worst air disas-
ter in Central American history.5 The captain and first officer,
survivors of the crash, were tried and acquitted of criminal neg-
ligence in Honduras.' The families of the deceased brought suit;
Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. v. de Brenes consolidated
thirty-one wrongful death actions filed in the Circuit Court for
Dade County, Florida.7 The parties stipulated that TAN-SAHSA
airlines was liable for compensatory damages arising from its
1. Wilson Ring, U.S. Officials Aid Probe of Honduran Air Crash, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 23, 1989, at 5, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, News File.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Henry Tricks, 111 People Killed in Honduran Air Crash, REUTER, Oct. 21,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
5. Ring, supra note 1.
6. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. v. de Brenes, 625 So. 2d. 4, 5 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev. denied, 632 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2711 (1994).
7. Id. The Florida Supreme Court recently rejected the forum non conveniens
doctrine developed by the lower courts on the basis of dictum in Houston v.
Caldwell, 359 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1978), and explicitly adopted the federal forum non
conveniens doctrine, as first outlined in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1946). The Court unanimously decried the practice of forum shopping, writing, "The
use of the Florida courts to police activities even in the remotest parts of the globe
is not a purpose for which our judiciary was created." Kinney System, Inc. v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 21 Fla. L. Weekly S43, S46-S47, (Fla. Jan. 25, 1996). As a result of
this decision, a case like TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes would probably be dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds were it brought today.
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negligence8 and that the case would be decided under Nicara-
guan law.' The only disputed issue was whether Nicaraguan
law permitted the recovery of moral damages."l
This case raises important questions regarding transnation-
al litigation. This note will address TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes
and the problems that arise when foreign law is litigated in the
United States. Part II paints a broad picture of the legal and
procedural history of this wrongful death action. Part III consid-
ers whether the Florida courts correctly interpreted Nicaraguan
law. Part IV explores the theories and doctrines available to a
court deciding a case governed by foreign law, and applies them
to TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes.
II. BACKGROUND
In TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes, the dispute centered around
the recoverability of moral damages, a civil law concept meaning
non-material damages. These damages generally compensate for
emotional harms - pain and suffering - caused by wrongdoing.
8. Record of Evidentiary Hearing at 38, Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. v.
de Brenes 625 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), sub non. Escobar v.
Transportes Aereos Nacionales S.A. (No. 90-23264), rev. denied, 632 So. 2d 1025
(Fla. 1994); cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994).
9. Id. at 38. The parties agreed not to apply the Nicaraguan Air Code, which
would otherwise have been determinative. Plaintiffs most likely wished to remain
outside of the Air Code because of the limits on liability contained therein. See
C6digo de Aviaci6n Civil de Nicaragua, arts. 214, 220 (setting specific limits on lia-
bility). By agreeing to determine the case according to the Civil Code, TAN-SAHSA
avoided exposing the jury to evidence of intentional misconduct (do/o), which would
be necessary to remove the liability limits under the Air Code. Interestingly, the
scope of damages in cases of doo is not defined within the Air Code, and conse-
quently the court would have to resort to the Civil Code to resolve the moral dam-
ages issue in either case.
Furthermore, the parties probably agreed to apply Nicaraguan law because
each thought they could persuade the court to agree with their own assessment of
damages. See Record of Evidentiary Hearing at 38, Transportes Aereos Nacionales,
S.A. v. de Brenes 625 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), sub noma. Escobar v.
Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. (No. 90-23264), rev. denied, 632 So. 2d 1025
(Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994).
The Warsaw Convention did not apply to this case because Nicaragua is not
a party to it. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Transportation by Air, Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876. See also Nica-
ragua, in 1 FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC LEGISLATION IN
JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (Thomas H. Reynolds & Arturo A. Flores eds., 1989).
10. Id.
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Moral damages can encompass pain suffered by the victim or the
victim's family for crimes or torts against the life, health, hones-
ty, integrity, or emotional well-being of the victim." Moral
damages are distinguishable from pecuniary damages, which can
be more precisely calculated and compensated for in monetary
terms.12 Compensatory damages are intended to restore the
injured party to the position or condition he or she was in prior
to the injury; these include what is described in the civil law
tradition as moral damages. 3 In TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes,
Judge Ferguson of the Florida Third District Court of Appeal
referred to material damages as compensatory, economic, or
pecuniary, and non-material damages as damages for pain and
suffering, or moral damages."'
The plaintiffs maintained that the Nicaraguan Civil Code
provided for recovery of both pecuniary and moral damages,
while the defendant-airline TAN-SAHSA argued that moral
damages were unrecoverable.15 The trial court determined that
both pecuniary and moral damages were recoverable under the
law of Nicaragua." The de Brenes plaintiffs were awarded stip-
ulated pecuniary damages of $1,000,000 and a jury verdict of
$1,500,000 in moral damages. 7  In Transportes Aereos
Nacionales, S.A. v. Crow,'s the Plaintiff was awarded pecuniary
11. ROSA MARIA ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, LA RESPONSABILIDAD DERVADA DEL
HECHO PUNIBLE 330-58 (1984).
12. Ellis v. Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 820 (Haw. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
392 (6th ed. 1990).
13. The term compensatory damages is synonymous with actual damages and
general damages. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434 (5th
Cir. 1962); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990). See also Saul Litvinoff,
Moral Damages, 38 LA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1977).
14. See also Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1128 n.8 (La. 1992)
(citing Litvinoff, supra note 13). Note that the Third District Court of Appeal fails to
make the distinction that pecuniary and economic damages are not the same as
compensatory damages. According to the usage of the court, compensatory damages
are more or less synonymous with pecuniary damages and do not encompass moral
damages. This is not the manner in which Saul Litvinoff defines them, i.e., as in-
cluding moral damages. See Litvinoff, supra note 13, at 27.
15. See Initial Brief for Appellant at 13, Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A,
625 So. 2d 4 [hereinafter Appellant's Initial Brief]; Appellees' Motion for Rehearing
en banc, Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d. 4, (Nos. 92-01408, 92-
00925) [hereinafter Appellees' Motion for Rehearing].
16. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 625 So. 2d at 5.
17. Id.
18. As previously noted, Transportes Aereos Nacionales, SA. v. de Brenes rep-
resents a consolidation of thirty-one separate actions. Transportes Aereos Nacionales,
S-A v. Crow was one of those actions consolidated on appeal. Transportes Aereos
[Vol. 27:1164
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damages of $144,000 and moral damages of $1,494,000.1' The
Third District Court of Appeal subjected the trial court's ruling
to plenary review20 and reversed, holding that the laws of Nica-
ragua did not permit the recovery of moral damages.21
The only issue on appeal was whether the language of Arti-
cle 2509 of the Nicaraguan Civil Code - and the entire applica-
ble corpus of Nicaraguan law - permitted recovery of moral
damages. That Article provides that those who negligently or
intentionally cause injury to another must redress those inju-
ries.22 Relying on Article 1835 of the Civil Code,23 which pro-
vides that legal obligations only arise where the code specifically
creates such an obligation,24 the court held that moral damages
could not be recovered because Article 2509 does not expressly
encompass them.2"
In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to Article 1865
to define "injury."2" Article 1865 states that indemnification en-
compasses both the loss suffered as well as lost profits.27
Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d 4.
19. Id.
20. The trial court's determination of foreign law constitutes a ruling on a
question of law, which gives the appellate court the power of plenary review over
the case. See Aboandandolo v. Vonella, 88 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1956); Kingston v.
Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955); FLA. STAT. § 90.202 (1993).
21. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d 4.
22. "Whoever by intentional misconduct, fault, negligence or imprudence, or by
malicious act causes damage to another is obligated to redress it along with the
harms." CODIGO CIVIL [C.Crv.] art. 2509 (Nic.) (notes omitted) (all translations by
author unless otherwise indicated).
In Spanish: "Art. 2509. Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o
imprudencia o por un hecho malicioso causa a otro un dafio, estA obligado a
repararlo junto con los perjuicios." Id.
23. "Legal liabilities may not be presumed. Only those liabilities expressly cre-
ated by this Code or in Special Laws are enforceable, and such liabilities will be
governed by the precepts of the law that created them, and in those cases where
this was not foreseen, by the dispositions of the present Book." C.CIV. art. 1835.
In Spanish: "Art. 1835. Las obligaciones derivadas de la ley no se presumen.
S61o son exigibles las expresamente determinadas en este C6digo o en las leyes
especiales, y se regirfin por los preceptos de la ley que las hubiere establecido, y en
los que dsta no hubiere previsto, por las disposiciones del presente Libro." Id.
24. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d at 6.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. "Indemnification of damages includes not only the amount of the loss that
has been suffered, but also that of the creditor's lost profits, except for the provi-
sions contained in the following articles." C.CIv. art. 1865.
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The court also looked to the Costa Rican Civil Code - from
which Nicaraguan Civil Code Article 2509 originated - for evi-
dence of legislative intent. The court found the Costa Rican
Code's failure to recognize moral damages at the time of its
drafting28 persuasive as to the interpretation of the Nicaraguan
Code provision.29
Noting that the revised Nicaraguan Penal Code of 1974
permits recovery of moral damages after a criminal convic-
tion,3" the court found that absent a similar revision the Civil
Code did not include moral damages." Since the airplane cap-
tain and first officer were acquitted of criminal charges, the
Penal Code provisions on damages could not be applied to this
case. Furthermore, because the Nicaraguan Civil Code does not
expressly provide for recovery of moral damages, the court rea-
soned that moral damages may not be awarded in a wrongful
death suit.
While the appeal was pending in the Third District, on
October 5, 1992 the Corte Suprema de Justicia de Nicaragua
(Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua) issued an Advisory
Opinion addressing this question.3 2 The opinion came in re-
sponse to a request by the Chief Judge of the Nicaraguan crimi-
nal court for a determination of whether moral damages were
recoverable under Article 2509 of the Civil Code. The Supreme
Court replied that the Civil Code of Nicaragua allowed recovery
of moral as well as material damages.33 After the Third District
made its decision, Appellees brought the Advisory Opinion to the
court's attention in their motion for rehearing en banc.3' How-
ever, the court denied the motion without reference to the Advi-
In Spanish: "Art. 1865. La indemnizaci6n de dafos y perjuicios comprende no
s6lo el valor de la pdrdida que haya sufrido, sino tambisn el de la ganancia que
haya dejado de obtener el acreedor, salvas las disposiciones contenidas en los
articulos siguientes." Id.
28. ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, supra note 11, at 336.
29. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Appendix to Appellees' Motion for Rehearing en banc, supra note 15, at
5. See also Advisory Opinion of Oct. 5, 1992, Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme
Court] (Nic.) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]. The Advisory Opinion is reproduced,
supra, in Appendix A.
33. Advisory Opinion, infra Appendix A.
34. See Appellees' Motion for Rehearing en banc, supra note 15.
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sory Opinion."
On March 23, 1993, twelve days after the Third District
Court of Appeal filed its opinion, the Asamblea Nacional de
Nicaragua (National Assembly of Nicaragua) issued an
Interpretaci6n Autintica de la Ley (Authentic Interpretation of
the Law),"6 in which it interpreted Articles 2509, 1837, 1838,
1865, and 3106 of the Civil Code, and Article 1123 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as permitting recovery of moral damages.37 The
following day, March 24, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
rehearing en banc in which they brought this development to the
court's attention." The plaintiffs' petitions for rehearing and re-
hearing en banc were both denied.39 The Third District Court of
Appeal did not acknowledge this act of the Nicaraguan National
Assembly.
Subsequently, plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court of
Florida' and the United States Supreme Court for certiora-
ri. 1 Both petitions were denied.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF NICARAGUAN LAW: WAS THIS DECISION
CORRECT?
A. Nicaraguan Law in Context: Problems with the System
Within the civil law tradition, the legislature is the only
binding source of law. As there exists no principle of stare decisis
as such, the judiciary has virtually no formal role as lawmaker
in a civil law country.42 Therefore, Nicaraguan law may be
35. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 625 So. 2d 4.
36. The Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly) has the power to issue such
Interpretaciones Autnticas (Authentic Interpretations) under Article 138(2) of the
Nicaraguan Constitution of 1987. CONSTITUCi&N POLITICA DE NICARAGUA DE 1987
[Constitution], art. 138(2) (Nic.) [hereinafter NIC. CONST.].
37. Ley No. 157, EL NUEvO DIARIO, Mar. 26, 1993, at 10 (Nic.) [hereinafter Au-
thentic Interpretation]. See infra Appendix B.
38. Appellees' Motion for Rehearing en banc, supra note 15.
39. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d 4.
40. de Brenes v. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 632 So. 2d 1025 (Table)
(Fla. 1994); Crow v. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 632 So. 2d 1025 (Table)
(Fla. 1994).
41. de Brenes v. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994).
42. See JoHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVL LAW TRADITION 23-14 (1969) (only
the legislature can make law in civil law systems); Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Method-
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found only in the Constitution of Nicaragua and in the codes
and laws promulgated by the National Assembly.'
Despite the seemingly organized appearance of the codes,
extrinsic factors complicate interpretations of Nicaraguan law.
The Civil Code of Nicaragua was promulgated in 1904, and has
never been significantly revised." By contrast, the Penal Code
was completely rewritten in 1974.45 Most recently, the Sandi-
nista government promulgated a new constitution in 1987. Since
the Codes have never been reconciled, there are many areas
where the 1987 Constitution, the Civil Code, and the Penal Code
contradict each other. For example, the 1987 Constitution prohi-
bits capital punishment." The Penal Code, however, establish-
es death as one of the eight principal penalties for the pu-
nishment of crimes. 47 Under the principle of constitutional su-
premacy,' the death penalty provision of the Penal Code is un-
constitutional, despite the fact that it remains on the books.
These contradictions create obstacles to understanding the
actual content and meaning of Nicaraguan law because there is
no uniform underlying concept.49 While this problem is not
unique to Nicaragua - U.S. law contains many such instances
of contradiction - it serves to illustrate the problems a U.S.
court may experience in attempting to find meaning for one
ology in Louisiana, 44 TUL. L. REV. 673 (1970) (the basis of all law is legislative in
civil law systems); Richard Wilson, Criminal Justice in Revolutionary Nicaragua, 23
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 269, 281-82. (1992) ("The study of civil law is the study
of codes. No other source of law - judicial decisions, treatises, regulations, custom,
or practice - carries the central significance of the code as the correct organized,
coordinated, unified expression of governing principles.").
43. See MERRYMAN, supra note 42; Tate, supra note 42; Wilson, supra note 42.
44. Nicaragua, in 1 FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC
LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 9.
45. Id.
46. NIC. CONST., art. 23.
47. C6DIGO PENAL [C.PEN.]. art. 53 (Nic.).
48. NIC. CoNST., art. 182. "Art. 182. The Political Constitution is the fundamen-
tal charter of the Republic; all other laws are subordinate to it. Any laws, treaties,
orders or provisions that oppose it or alter its provisions shall be null and void." Id
In Spanish: "Arto. 182. La Constituci6n Politica es la carts fundamental de la
Repdblica; las demos leyes estAn subordinadas a ella. No tendrin valor alguno las
leyes, tratados, ordenes o disposiciones que se le opongan o alteren sus
disposiciones." Id.
49. In fact, the values underlying the Constitution, Civil and Penal Codes of
Nicaragua differ radically. Nicaragua was governed by three different philosophical,
legal, and governmental regimes at the times of the promulgation of the Civil Code
of 1904, the Penal Code of 1974, and the Constitution of 1987.
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Nicaraguan code within the provisions of another.
B. Interpreting the Codes of Nicaragua
Article 2509 of the Civil Code states: "Anyone who, by inten-
tional misconduct (dolo), fault, negligence, or imprudence or
through a malicious act causes damage (dafo) to another is
obliged to redress it, along with the harms (perjuicios)."° The
article refers to pecuniary damages, but does not mention puniti-
ve or moral damages.51 TAN-SAHSA argued, and the Third
District Court agreed, that the failure of the code to state speci-
fically that moral damages may be recovered precludes their re-
covery.52
Since Article 2509 of the Nicaraguan Civil Code was taken
from the Civil Code of Costa Rica, the defendants argued that
the legislative history of the Costa Rican provision was informa-
tive as to its Nicaraguan counterpart.53 Because there was no
recovery of moral damages under Costa Rican law at the time of
adoption, defendants argued, there could be no recovery of such
damages under Nicaraguan law.' Subsequent to its adoption
by Nicaragua, however, the Costa Rican Civil Code provision
was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Costa Rica to encom-
pass moral damages.5
50. C.Crv., art. 2509.
51. The Spanish dahos y perjuiios, which appears throughout the Nicaraguan
codes, derives from the Roman law concepts of damnum emergens and lucrum ces-
sans. The former refers to the victim's out-of-pocket loss, while the latter refers to
the victim's future loss of profits. R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 387 (3d
ed. 1952). Daios y perjuicios is usually translated as "damages."
52. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. v. de
Brenes, 625 So. 2d. 4 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 92-01408, 92-00925), rev.
denied, 632 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994) [hereinafter
Appellant's Reply Brief].
53. C.Civ. art. 2509.
54. Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 52, at 10. Nicaragua modified the article
slightly by addition of one clause, indicated below in italics. "Everyone who by inten-
tional misconduct, fault, negligence or imprudence, or by malicious act causes injury
to another is obligated to repair it along with the harms." C.CIv. art. 2509, (notes
omitted) (emphasis added).
In Spanish: "Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia o por
un hecho malicioso causa a otro un dafho, estA obligado a repararlo junto con los
perjuicios." Id.
55. ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, supra note 11, at 330-58.
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French law, from which the Costa Rican provision was
drawn, also allows for recovery of moral damages.5 6 The Cour
de Cassation (Supreme Court of France) interpreted language in
its Civil Code, similar to that found in the Costa Rican Code, to
permit recovery of moral damages.5 7 Prior to TAN-SAHSA v. de
Brenes, however, neither the Nicaraguan courts nor the legis-
lature had provided an interpretation expanding the notion of
damages in Article 2509 to include moral damages.
Plaintiffs argued that the provisions of the various Nicara-
guan codes should be read together in order to interpret the
damages referred to in Article 2509. They maintained that
"damages" should be read in light of its significance in the Penal
Code, where recovery of moral damages is permitted. Further-
more, plaintiffs posited that several different Civil Code provi-
sions read together would enable the heirs of plane crash dece-
dents to recover moral damages in an action for wrongful death.
Article 3106 of the Civil Code provides that the "business
person [business person] ... shall always be [liable] for indemni-
fication of the damages in conformance with the provisions of
the Penal Code."58 Article 3110 establishes the Nicaraguan
equivalent of respondeat superior in cases involving the trans-
portation of goods or passengers.59 Article 3121 establishes that
any contractual rights the parties may have will not be extin-
guished by death, but will be passed on to their heirs.6 Accord-
56. Litvinoff, supra note 13.
57. Id. at 4.
58. 'The business person [owner] will not be responsible for the misdemeanors
to which the previous article refers [providing that the passengers and vehicle own-
ers shall not be liable for traffic violations committed by the driver. C.CIV. art.
3105] as far as the penalties, unless the [business person] was at fault; but the
[business person] shall always be [liable] for the indemnification of the damages in
conformance with the provisions of the Penal Code." C.CwV. art. 3106.
In Spanish: "Arto. 3106. El empresario no seri responsable de las faltas de
que trata el artfculo que precede, en cuanto a las penas, sino cuando tuviera culpa;
pero lo serd siempre de la indemnizaci6n de los dafios y perjuicios conforme a las
prescripciones de C6digo Penal." Id.
59. 'The business owners of carriages or public transportation [vehicles] have
the responsibility set forth in Art. 3106 even though they are not themselves the
driver, except for their right against the latter in the event that they are found
guilty of the damage." C.CIv. art. 3110.
In Spanish: "Arto. 3110. Los empresarios de carruajes o transportes pdblicos
tienen la responsabilidad expresada en el art. 3106 aunque no sean ellos mismos los
conductores, salvo su derecho contra dstos en caso que resulten culpables del dafto."
Id.
60. "The death of the carrier or of the passenger does not terminate the con-
[Vol. 27:1170
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ing to the plaintiffs, these provisions together invoke the defini-
tion of damages as understood in the Penal Code.
Article 10 of the Penal Code defines "quasi-delict"6' "as an
action or damaging omission by an agent for whose actions a
person is liable by virtue of the civil relationship that links him
with said agent, as determined by law. Quasi-delicts result only
in civil liability."6 2 The Penal Code thus covers not only crimi-
nal liability and civil liability for those convicted of criminal
offenses, but also civil liability under respondeat superior. The
definition of quasi-delict found in the Civil Code indicates that
the concept lies somewhere between civil liability and criminal
liability, approximating a common law tort. 3
tract; the obligations are transmitted to the respective heirs, without prejudice to the
defense of force majeure or act of God." C.Civ. art. 3121.
In Spanish: "Art. 3121. La muerte del acarreador o del pasajero no pone fin
al contrato; las obligaciones se trasmiten a los respectivos heraderos, sin perjuicio de
lo dispuesto generalmente sobre fuerza mayor o caso fortuito." Id.
61. The following explanation by Bruce W. Frier provides a clearer under-
standing of this confusing concept.
Quasi-delict is a murky category that was probably not accepted
until the postclassical period, although the law teacher Gains seems to
know it already in mid-second century A.D. The category collects several
types of liability, all established in classical law, that for one reason or
another are not easily explained as delicts. In all of them, one person
has suffered loss, and another person is held liable for that loss even if
he or she did not directly inflict it; the defendant may not be at fault,
but at least had the opportunity to prevent the loss from occurring. Since
the defendant's fault is not necessarily involved, the liability is not delic-
tual; rather, it is said to arise "as if from a delict" (quasi ex delicto).
The Praetor's Edict established that if something was poured or
thrown from an upstairs dwelling onto a public way, and it caused dam-
age to persons or property beneath, the principal occupant of the dwell-
ing was liable even though he or she was not the culprit. In this sort of
situation, a victim may find it difficult to establish the culprit's identity;
but whether this is possible or not, the occupant is held liable, perhaps
on the theory that he or she had failed to exercise sufficient over-
sight ....
Quasi-delict is mainly interesting for the ways in which it begins
to go beyond the classical principles of delictual law, in order to establish
liabilities based not on demonstrable fault (dolus or culpa), but on imput-
ed failure of oversight - a form of strict liability that has become far
more prominent in modern law.
BRUCE W. FRIER, A CASEBOOK ON THE ROMAN LAW OF DELICT 227 (1989).
62. C.PEN. art. 10. In Spanish: "Arto. 10. Constituye cuasidelito la acci6n u
omisi6n dafiosa de un agente de cuyos hechos es responsable una persona en virtud
de relaci6n civil que la liga con dicho agente, determinada por la ley. Los
cuasidelitos s6lo producen responsabilidad civil." Id.
63. See also Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materials
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Turning to the Penal Code section defining damages, Article
46 specifically mentions moral damages: "The indemnification of
damages will be prudently determined by the Court, if there is
lack of evidence of the value of the material or moral harm
caused by the punishable action, especially the harm caused to
the industry or business, life, health, honor or reputation of the
offended party."" As under the Civil Code, the rights of the
offended party or victim are passed on to the family of that par-
ty.
6 5
Plaintiffs' interpretation of damages according to the Penal
Code would be very persuasive were it not for Article 1122 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. That Section provides: 'The judgment
rendered in a criminal proceeding can be applied in civil cases,
provided that the defendant is convicted."" This means that
the issues litigated in a criminal trial will be considered res
judicata in a subsequent civil trial so long as a conviction re-
sults.67
Articles 1837 and 1838 of the Civil Code specify where the
Penal Code may be invoked for the purpose of determining the
nature and extent of civil liability. Article 1837 provides: "Civil
obligations that arise from delicts or misdemeanors will be gov-
erned by the provisions of the Penal Code."68 This indicates
that civil liability arising from delicts and misdemeanors are de-
for the Decision of a Case, 17 TUL. L. REv. 159, 161 (1942).
64. C.PEN. art. 46.
In Spanish: "Arto. 46. La indemnizaci6n de perjuicios de hard determinado
prudencialmente el Tribunal, a falta de prueba, el valor de perjuicio material o mor-
al originado por el hecho punible y especialmente el perjuicio causado en la indu-
stria o negocio, en la vida, salud, honra o reputaci6n del ofendido." Id.
65. "The obligation to restore, repair the damage or to indemnify the prejudices,
is transmitted to the heirs of the responsible [one]; and the action to ask for restitu-
tion, reparation, or indemnification, is transmitted equally to the heirs of the
prejudiced." C.PEN. art. 49.
In Spanish: "Arto. 49. La obligaci6n de restituir, reparar el dafio o
indemnizar los peirjuicios, se trasmite a los herederos del responsable; y la acci6n
para pedir la restituci6n, reparaci6n o indemnizaci6n, se trasmite igualmente a los
herederos del perjudicado." Id.
66. CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CML [C. PROC. CwV.], art. 1122 (Nic.). In Span-
ish: "Art. 1122. En los juicios civiles podrdn hacerse valer las sentencias dictadas en
un proceso criminal, siempre que condenen al reo." Id.
67. TAN-SAHSA argued that this Article creates a prerequisite of criminal lia-
bility before the cross reference of Article 3106 of the Civil Code may be applied.
See Appellant's Initial Brief, supra note 15, at 17.
68. C.CIV. art. 1837. In Spanish: "Art. 1837. Las obligaciones civiles que nacen
de los delitos o faltas, se regirdn por las disposiciones del C6digo Penal." Id.
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termined according to the Penal Code, Book I, Title II, Chapter
VI, "Rules to Determine Civil Responsibility." Article 1838 of the
Civil Code deals with quasi-delicts: "Those [civil obligations] that
arise out of acts or omissions in which non-criminal fault or
negligence intervenes, will be determined according to the dispo-
sitions of Title VIII Sole Chapter [of the Civil Code]."69
Title VIII, Sole Chapter of the Civil Code begins with Article
2509, which establishes that the actor causing a quasi-delict
must repair the harms by paying damages. Article 2520, also
found within that Chapter, indicates that the disposition of civil
obligations resulting from delicts or misdemeanors will be made
according to the Penal Code.70 In the final analysis, the Penal
Code does not directly cover civil liability arising from quasi-
delicts absent a criminal conviction, and thus the meaning of the
term perjuicios (damages) as used in Article 2509 remains un-
clear.
In order to determine whether TAN-SAHSA may be liable
for moral damages in a wrongful death action, where the surviv-
ing pilot and first officer of the aircraft were acquitted of crimi-
nal wrongdoing,7 one must determine the nature of that
wrongful death obligation. The Penal Code provisions on liability
would only apply to TAN-SAHSA's quasi-delictual liability if
that liability were incurred through the criminal actions of the
company's agents or employees. Corporations may not be con-
victed of criminal offenses in Nicaragua; consequently, the defi-
nition of quasi-delict comprehends vicarious corporate liability
for the wrongful acts of its employees. Where a company's em-
ployee or agent has been convicted of a crime, liability for a
quasi-delict may be determined according to the damages provi-
sions of the Penal Code. However, given the fact that the cap-
tain and first officer of Flight 414 were acquitted of criminal
69. C.CIv. art. 1838. In Spanish: "Art. 1838. Las [obligaciones civiles] que
derivan de actos u omisiones en que intervenga culpa o negligencia no penadas por
la ley, quedar~n sometidas a las disposiciones del Titulo VIII Capitulo alnico." Id.
70. "With reference to civil responsibility for delicts and misdemeanors which
are the subject of criminal trial, it will be [governed] by the dispositions of the Pe-
nal Code." C.Cv. art. 2520.
In Spanish: "Art. 2520. En cuanto a la responsabilidad civil por los delitos y
faltas de que se conozca en juicio criminal, se estard a lo dispuesto en el C6digo
Penal." Id.
71. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d at 5.
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charges, TAN-SAHSA's vicarious liability arises from mere neg-
ligence, which falls under Article 1838 of the Civil Code.
It may be possible to refer to the Penal Code with the limit-
ed purpose of learning how the term "damages" is defined within
that Code. However, it is difficult to argue persuasively that the
1974 Penal Code could shed any light on the intent of the draft-
ers of the 1904 Civil Code. It seems that absent some definitive
governmental action or authoritative interpretation, moral dam-
ages were not recoverable at the time of the TAN-SAHSA litiga-
tion.
C. The Advisory Opinion of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court
The TAN-SAHSA case stirred interest in Nicaragua among
the friends and family of the decedents as well as among mem-
bers of the government. Additionally, plaintiffs' expert witness
was a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Justice of
Nicaragua.72
The Nicaraguan Supreme Court issued an Advisory Opinion
addressing the controversy before the Third District Court of
Appeal. The opinion responded to a request for clarification by
Germdn Vasquez C., a judge from the First Criminal District of
Nicaragua. 3 Judge Vasquez inquired whether damages in Arti-
cle 2509 of the Civil Code included only material damages or
whether it also encompassed moral damages.74 Judge Vasquez
also inquired as to who may inherit the right to recover damages
under Article 288 of the Civil Code.7" The Supreme Court, in an
Advisory Opinion dated October 5, 1992, responded:
The Civil Code of Nicaragua, in Articles 2509, et seq., estab-
lishes civil liability for damages in their totality, without
exclusion, which is to say that it encompasses material dam-
72. Alejandro Montiel Arguello, Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, former Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United Nations, former Secretary of
State of Nicaragua, former Nicaraguan Ambassador to Panama, former President of
the Corte Suprema de Justicia. See Record of Evidentiary Hearing at 214-15,
Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. v. de Brenes 625 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993), sub nom. Escobar v. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. (No. 90-23264),
rev. denied, 632 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994).
73. See Advisory Opinion, infra Appendix A.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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ages as well as moral damages. There exists no provision in
the law referring to damages which limits them [damages] to
strictly material damages, and that excludes moral damag-
es.
76
The opinion refers the reader to several cases decided by the
Corte Suprema de Justicia. Though cases have little precedential
value within the civil law tradition, they may be persuasive
when several reach the same conclusion." Unfortunately these
cases offer little insight. Although they included requests for
recovery of moral damages, only one case actually awarded such
damages, but not for wrongful death. None of the opinions ex-
plained the reasoning for denying an award of moral damages.
The Supreme Court never indicated that moral damages were
not recoverable under Nicaraguan law; nor did the Court limit
its decision to any particular factual situation.78 The following
discussion of the cases referred to in the Advisory Opinion fur-
ther illustrates the difficulty of determining the law within the
civil law tradition as it exists in Nicaragua.
In Obando de Gomez v. Compahia El6ctrica de Granada,9
the intermediate appellate court awarded moral damages for
negligence resulting in the electrocution of one of the plain-
tiffs.8" In that case, the plaintiff recovering moral damages did
so on an action for disfigurement. When the case was appealed
to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, the Court never specifically
addressed the award of moral damages.8 It should be noted,
however, that another plaintiff suing for wrongful death never
received moral damages, for reasons unstated.82
76. Id.
In Spanish: "El C6digo Civil de Nicaragua en sus Artos. 2509 y siguientes
establece la responsabilidad civil por daos y perjuicios en su totalidad, sin
exclusi6n, es decir, que comprende tanto dafos materiales como morales. No existe
provisi6n aguna de la ley, al referirse a los dafios y perjuicios que las limite a
dafios estrictamente materiales, que excluya los dafos morales." Id.
77. MERRYMAN, supra note 42.
78. Advisory Opinion, infra Appendix A.
79. Judgment of Sept. 28, 1956, Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court],
Bol. Jud. 18,234 (Nic.).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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In Burgos Chamorro v. Ferrocarril del Pacifico de Nicara-
gua,' a consolidated action for injuries resulting from a rail-
road accident, the trial court simply stated that there are no
moral damages, and the Supreme Court stated that the "claim
for moral damages .. is inadmissible."" In other cases re-
ferred to in the Advisory Opinion, the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court either neglected to address the issue or dismissed the
claims seeking such damages without any specific reference to
moral damages.'
D. The Authentic Interpretation by the Nicaraguan Na-
tional Assembly
Under Article 138 of the Nicaraguan Constitution, the
Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly) has the power to "au-
thentically interpret" the law of Nicaragua.8" The doctrine of
authentic interpretation finds it roots in Roman law. The Em-
peror Constantine first reserved for himself the power to inter-
pret the law.87 Under the rule of Justinian, only the Emperor
could interpret the codes, and such interpretations had the
"perfect force of law."'
Interpretation by a tribunal was based upon a delegation of
the legislator's interpretive power to that court. Such interpreta-
tion was limited to the case in which it was rendered, thus pre-
venting the tribunal from usurping the power. The doctrine that
only the legislator could interpret the law gave the power of in-
terpretation to the king of France prior to the French Revolu-
tion, and to the legislature after the Revolution.89 When a dis-
puted issue of law reached the Cour de Cassation for the third
83. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1965, Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court],
Bol. Jud. 8 (Nic.).
84. Id.
85. See Judgment of Apr. 2, 1968 (Carazo Olivier v. Texaco Caribbean, Inc.),
Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court], Bol. Jud. 8 (Nic.); Judgment of Aug. 7,
1949 (Renato Vivas v. Esso Standard Oil Co.), Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme
Court], Bol. Jud. 56 (Nic.).
86. Nic. CoNST., art. 138(2).
87. A Symposium on Legal and Political Hermeneutics: Legal and Political Her-
meneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, with
Remarks on Precedents and Authorities, Note E: Authentic Interpretation, 16 CARDOzo
L. REV. 2069 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium].
88. Id. at 2070.
89. Id. at 2071-72.
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time, the Court was directed to inform the legislature, which
would then pass a declaratory resolution interpreting the law.
This interpretive act constituted a new law interpreting an old
law, and had retroactive effect.90
On March 23, 1993, Nicaragua's National Assembly re-
sponded to a request9' for an authentic interpretation of the
meaning of "damages" as it appears in Article 2509 of the Civil
Code. The request was filed by Representative Reynaldo Antonio
Tefel, et al. of the National Assembly "[flor the purpose of dispel-
ling erroneous interpretations which could give rise to unjust
and contradictory judicial decisions to the harm of private par-
ties .... .92 The decree of the National Assembly states that:
Civil liability for damages referred to in Article 2509, et seq.,
of the Civil Code . . . , in its entirety and without exception,
encompasses both material as well as moral damages. There
exists no provision in the law whatsoever which limits them
to damages which are strictly material and excludes moral
damages.93
As the legislature is the definitive source of law under the
civil law tradition, and as the Authentic Interpretation is a law
enacted by the legislature, the decree is authoritative.94 Clearly
the laws of Nicaragua currently provide for recovery of moral
damages. However, the applicability of the Authentic Interpreta-
tion to TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes is not as clear. Defendant
TAN-SAHSA argued that the Authentic Interpretation actually
expanded the damages recoverable under Article 2509, and
therefore its application to the case sub judice would have con-
stituted an impermissible retroactive law.9" As the 1987 Consti-
90. Id. at 2072.
91. Requests for authentic interpretations may come from the President of the
Republic, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Supreme Electoral Council, or five mem-
bers of the National Assembly. See Martha I. Morgan, Founding Mothers: Women's
Voices and Stories in the 1987 Nicaraguan Constitution, 70 B.U. L. REV. 1, 47 n.192
(1990).
92. Appellant's Notice of Supplemental Authority at 2, Transportes Aereos
Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d 4.
93. Authentic Interpretation, infra Appendix B.
94. See generally MERRYMAN, supra note 42.
95. Appellant's Notice of Supplemental Authority at 3, Transportes Aereos
Nacionales, S.A, 625 So. 2d 4.
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tution prohibits the enactment of retroactive laws,9" application
of this expansive interpretation would not pass constitutional
muster.
This issue is not easily resolved. The very name of the act
seems to indicate that the National Assembly thought that it
was interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law.
Furthermore, the doctrine of Authentic Interpretation historical-
ly allowed for retroactive effect of an interpretive law.9 7 Howev-
er, as the law did not permit recovery of moral damages for a
quasi-delict, the "interpretation" bears an uncanny resemblance
to expansion of legal rights and liabilities. Additionally, the
structure of the interpretive law more closely resembles that of a
judicial opinion rather than a legislative enactment. Generally
speaking, laws do not contain explanations or justifications in
their text; any legislative history is separate from the law itself.
IV. FOREIGN LAW, U.S. COURTS, AND TAN-SAHSA v. DE
BRENES
This case raises many interesting and complicated questions
regarding the litigation of foreign legal claims in the U.S. The
most compelling question, however, is who should have the final
word on the meaning of Nicaraguan law. There are several legal
doctrines and tools used in addressing foreign law when it ap-
pears in U.S. courts, many of which were neglected by the Third
District Court of Appeal.
A Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Since the introduction of Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, foreign law has been a matter of law for the
determination of a judge in the federal courts.98 Trial court de-
cisions on a question of foreign law will be subjected to plenary
review by appellate courts, and decisions of courts in the U.S. on
matters of foreign law have precedential value.99
96. NiC. CONST., art. 38.
97. Symposium, supra note 87, at 2072.
98. FED. R. Cirv. P. 44.1.
99. The Notes by the Advisory Committee on the Adoption of Federal Rule 44.1
indicate that the intent of the sentence, "[tihe court's determination shall be treated
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This significantly altered the common law approach, under
which foreign law was a matter of fact to be pled and proven by
the parties."°° Rule 44.1 provides that the court "may consider
any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence." °1 The Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law in-
dicates that the local law of the forum determines the manner
for addressing foreign law.'0° Since the adoption of the Uni-
form Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws Act,0 3 which has been
superseded by Florida Statute Section 90.202,1' 4 Florida has
turned away from the common law approach. The revised Flori-
da Evidence Code provides that a Florida court may take judi-
cial notice of the laws of foreign nations.' Thus the interpre-
tation of foreign law becomes a question of law, to be determined
by the court. 06
Under Section 90.202, Florida courts treat foreign law much
as federal courts do under Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
as a ruling on a question of law," was to enable appellate courts to review such
rulings de novo, thus removing the "clearly erroneous" standard of review imposed
on determinations of fact by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Id.; see also WILLIAM B. STERN,
Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CAL. L. REV. 23 (1957).
100. Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the
Law of Conflicts, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 602 (1975).
101. FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws § 136 (1971).
103. FLA. STAT. § 92.031, repealed by Laws 1976, ch. 76-237, § 2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. FLA. STAT. § 90.202 (1993), Law Revision Council Note (1976). Perhaps the
tort case of Walton v. American Arabian Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), best illustrates some of the problems experienced under
the common law regime. In that case, the Second Circuit found that the conflict of
law rules of the State of New York followed the principle of lex loci delicti commissi.
Since the location of the injury was Saudi Arabia, and the plaintiff failed to plead
and prove Saudi law, the case was dismissed for failure to prove all elements of the
cause of action. Even though New York law permitted judicial notice of foreign law
at the time, the court held that the party seeking to rely on that law must provide
notice of their intent to rely upon the foreign law, and proof of the content of the
relevant portions of the foreign law. As the plaintiff was an Arkansas resident who
was merely visiting Saudi Arabia when injured, he had relatively little knowledge of
Saudi law. The defendant, on the other hand, was an oil company with extensive
contacts with Saudi Arabia and extensive experience with Saudi law. Thus the court
reached an unjust result that could have been avoided by taking notice of Saudi law
sua sponte, or by requiring American Arabian Oil Company to provide the necessary
information. Id.
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Procedure. °7 The party seeking to rely upon foreign law must
provide sufficient notice of the intent to invoke foreign law,"~
and must plead it in order to obtain judicial notice."° Parties
may provide evidence of foreign law to aid the court through the
use of expert witnesses, documentary evidence, official reporters
and other officially recognized sources.1 Florida courts have
broad discretion as to what sources they may consider in deter-
mining foreign law. Florida statute Section 90.204 provides that
the courts may use "any source of pertinent and reliable infor-
mation, whether or not furnished by a party, without regard to
any exclusionary rule except a valid claim of privilege."1 The
statute also provides that the parties must be afforded the op-
portunity to challenge the information."
In the absence of sufficient information about the foreign
law or a request to take judicial notice thereof, Florida courts
may presume that the foreign law in question is the same as
that of the forum."3 Florida law additionally provides that the
court may be compelled to take judicial notice of foreign law
where a party requests it do so. In this circumstance, that party
must provide notice to the adverse party along with sufficient
information to enable the court to take judicial notice of the
foreign law."4 In any case, should the court find that the par-
ties have not provided sufficient evidence of the foreign law, the
court is not required to take judicial notice." 5
107. Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 93 Bankr. Rep. 286, 289
(M.D. Fla. 1988).
108. Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1955).
109. Robert A. Jefferies, Jr., Recognition of Foreign Law by American Courts, 35
U. CiN. L. REv. 578, 614 (1966).
110. STERN, supra note 99. See also Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 191
F. Supp. 206, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
111. FLA. STAT. § 90.204(2) (1993).
112. Id. § 90.204(3).
113. See id. § 90.202, sponsor's note (1993); Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos
Mexicanos, 93 Bankr. Rep. 286 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Ganem v. Ganem de Issa, 269 So.
2d 740 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
114. FLA STAT. § 90.203 (1993).
115. Id. Florida choice of law doctrine prescribes that parties must provide evi-
dence of the foreign law upon which they seek to rely. Failure to do so may result
in the court assuming that the foreign law is identical to that of the forum.
Aboandandolo v. Vonella, 88 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1956); Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1955); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ciarrochi, 573 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Judicial notice statutes allow a court to investigate foreign
law sua sponte; the court does not have to rely upon representa-
tions of the parties to determine the meaning and content of
foreign law."' However, practice has shown that as most
courts lack access to and experience with foreign law, they look
to the parties to provide the necessary information and interpre-
tations of the law in question."7
B. Judicial Notice and TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes
The Third District Court of Appeal clearly took judicial
notice of Nicaraguan law. The court studied several provisions of
the law and announced its interpretation in its opinion. Given
the court's failure to mention the Advisory Opinion or Authentic
Interpretation, the court probably did not take judicial notice of
those acts, despite requests from the plaintiffs to do so."'
Generally, an official declaration of foreign law, emanating
from a governmental source, suffices as proof of that foreign law
where the parties seek judicial notice by a U.S. court." In
TAN-SAHSA, the Advisory Opinion and Authentic Interpreta-
tion comprised two such declarations.
Some scholars question reliance on such potentially partial
declarations. In cases where the foreign state or entity is a party
in U.S. courts, a declaration of foreign law may be self-serving
and thus less reliable.' Here, though not a party, the interest
of the Nicaraguan government possibly lay in increasing the
recovery of its citizens, as such a sum would undoubtedly affect
the Nicaraguan economy. The timing of the two actions in re-
lation to the progress of the Florida litigation certainly brings
motivation into question.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, these declarations constitute
the law of Nicaragua,"' and as such there is a benefit to be
116. FLA. STAT. § 90.202 (1993); FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
117. See Alexander, supra note 100.
118. See Appellees' Motion for Rehearing, supra note 15.
119. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 44(a)(2).
120. Walter A. Rafalko, Pleading, Proving and Obtaining Information on Foreign
Law, 43 U. DEW. L. REv. 95, 97 (1965); Jefferies, supra note 109, at 597.
121. Though the weight of authority accorded the Advisory Opinion may be de-
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derived from their use as authoritative sources of Nicaraguan
law. As such, the declarations from the judicial and legislative
branches of the Nicaraguan Government merited consideration
by the Court.
C. Comity
An alternate method of dealing with foreign law in U.S.
courts is the modern doctrine of comity. By use of this doctrine,
U.S. courts may extend full recognition to the acts of a foreign
executive, legislature, or judiciary. The early case of Hilton v.
Guyot"2 describes comity in detail:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of
the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The ex-
tent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its
territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by
judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the domin-
ion of another nation, depends on what our greatest jurists
have been content to call 'the comity of nations."'
Courts extend comity to the judicial or legislative acts of
foreign sovereigns "not as a matter of obligation, but out of defe-
rence and mutual respect.""' Comity will generally be extend-
ed where no interest of the forum would be injured by giving
effect to the foreign act. 5
Certain requirements must be met before a U.S. court will
extend comity to the judicial orders and judgments of a foreign
court. Generally, a foreign judgment must have been rendered
by a court with jurisdiction, in a proceeding where all concerned
had adequate notice, and where there was no evidence of fraud
or deceit. 6 Recognition of a decision from a foreign court
bated, the Authentic Interpretation clearly constitutes a duly enacted law with un-
disputed authority. As discussed earlier, there is some question as to the nature of
that law; if it was merely an interpretation, then it applies to the case sub judice.
On the other hand, if the National Assembly expanded the damages recoverable un-
der Nicaraguan law, then the Authentic Interpretation has only prospective effect,
and does not bear on this case.
122. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
123. Id. at 163.
124. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
125. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164.
126. Id. at 166-67.
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through comity makes that decision res judicata as to the forum
jurisdiction. 7 As a general rule, U.S. courts seek to ensure
that a foreign judgment withstands a due process inquiry before
extending recognition."
Although the U.S. Constitution requires that state courts
extend full faith and credit to the judgments of a sister state's
courts,' this requirement does not apply between a court in
the U.S. and a court of a foreign nation.130 Thus, U.S. courts
recognize and enforce foreign acts out of courtesy rather than
obligation.
In Herron v. Passailaigue,131 the Florida Supreme Court
established the modern doctrine of comity in Florida. In discuss-
ing the doctrine, the Court remarked as follows:
The comity of nations cannot be recognized as capricious -
as depending upon arbitrary whims or tyrannic impulses. It
has grown into a system whose sanctions are reason, religion,
and the common interests of all, for the violation of which
states are amenable to the public sentiment of the world. The
rules admitted by civilized states upon this subject are found-
ed not only in convenience, but in necessity; without them,
commerce could not exist between the states .... The whole
system of agencies, purchases and sales, mutual credits, and
transfers of negotiable instruments depends upon the jus
gentium. In fact, nothing so much distinguishes civilized from
savage states as this comity of the nations. 2
In Herron, the court decided that comity was properly ex-
tended in cases of marriage and divorce." This doctrine sur-
127. Id.
128. Id. See also Cardenas v. de Solis, 570 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
129. U.S. CONST., art. lV, § 1. It should be noted that judgments of courts of
sister states may be challenged on the basis of due process. The jurisdiction in
which enforcement is sought may refuse to enforce a judgment where the affected
party was not accorded due process. However, the potential for challenging a judg-
ment of a sister state ends there. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873); Herron v. Passailaigue, 110 So.
539 (Fla. 1926).
130. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912).
131. 110 So. 539 (Fla. 1926).
132. Id. at 544 (citing Cox v. Adams, 2 Ga. 158 (1847)).
133. Id. at 544.
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vives today." In Florida, courts may grant comity to judg-
ments of foreign courts, but usually do so only in the case of
final orders.135 Generally, however, Florida will grant comity to
foreign judgments unless there exists a paramount public policy
to the contrary.'
There are, however, several Florida cases which extend
comity to non-final orders of foreign courts. In Belle Island In-
vestment Co., Ltd. v. Feingold,"17 the Third District Court of
Appeal extended comity to an order of St. Vincent and the Gren-
adines," appointing a private receiver for Belle Island Invest-
ment and granting a temporary injunction to prevent the officers
of the company from disposing of partnership assets.39
The Third District Court of Appeal also extended comity to
foreign interlocutory judicial acts in Cardenas v. de Solis.'"' In
that case, the Third District Court of Appeal upheld a temporary
injunction freezing assets in a Dade County bank. The circuit
court entered the injunction at the request of a Guatemalan
court which had a domestic relations case pending before it.'
The Third District Court of Appeal recently indicated that it
remains amenable to extending comity to foreign interlocutory
orders in Nahar v. Nahar." The court upheld an order extend-
ing comity to a non-final order of the Hague." The Third Dis-
134. See, e.g., Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604 (Fla.
1953); Ogden v. Ogden, 33 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1947); Belle Island Inv. Co., Ltd. v.
Feingold, 453 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
135. Cardenas v. de Solis, 570 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
136. Belle Island Inv. Co., Ltd. v. Feingold, 453 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
137. Id.
138. An independent state within the British Commonwealth. Id. at 1143.
139. Id.
140. 570 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
141. The court acknowledged the general rule against granting comity to non-
final orders of foreign courts, explaining that it would be an "undue burden for
American courts to become entangled in the otherwise unfamiliar intricacies of for-
eign court practice by recognizing or enforcing the temporary court orders of another
country, orders which are subject to being vacated, withdrawn, or superseded." Id.
The court also indicated, however, that there is a particular public policy interest in
granting comity to non-final orders which seek to protect a spouse or child in a do-
mestic relations suit or seek to protect a creditor in collecting on a valid debt. Id.
142. 656 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
143. The case involved a suit brought by six adult children to enforce an ante-
nuptial agreement between their father and his second wife. The agreement provided
that no community property would exist between the parties. At the time of dece-
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trict Court of Appeal decided the case on the basis of the Re-
statement (Second) Conflict of Laws, Section 98. The court
wrote,
[a]s used in the Restatement of this Subject, "judgment" is a
general term which includes not only judgments at law but
also the orders, injunctions or decrees of equity and the judg-
ments of probate courts, admiralty courts and other special
courts. .. ." Consequently, it appears that any foreign decree
should be entitled to comity, where the parties have been
given notice and the opportunity to be heard, where the for-
eign court had original jurisdiction and where the foreign
decree does not offend the public policy of the State of Flor-
ida.'"
Recognition and enforcement will also be extended through
the doctrine to foreign legislative acts. Often a forum court ap-
plies the substantive provisions of a foreign law to a cause of
action before that court through the extension of comity. Gener-
ally, the question of extending comity to legislative acts of a
foreign jurisdiction arises where a forum must determine
whether to apply its law or that of another jurisdiction to an
action pending before it. 14 Where a potentially applicable for-
eign law conflicts with the law of the forum, the choice-of-law
analysis should seek to reconcile the central policy consider-
dent Roebi Nahar's death, he was living in Miami with his second wife, Glenda, and
their three dependent children. His six adult children lived in Aruba, Netherlands
Antilles. Roebi Nahar died intestate in Miami, and within nine days of his death,
Glenda effectively closed five of Roebi's six Dade County, Florida bank accounts. The
six adult children petitioned the court of first instance (in Aruba) to have Roebi's
Aruban properties and Dade bank accounts administered under the law of the Neth-
erlands Antilles. Glenda appeared to challenge the petition, and the court ruled in
favor of the six adult children. Glenda appealed to the Court of Cassation of the
Netherlands, commonly known as the Hague, and lost. The Court of Cassation de-
clared that Dutch law, rather than Florida law, controlled in a suit to settle the
decedent's estate. The Florida trial court ruled the Hague decision res judicata and
granted summary judgment in, favor of the six adult children. On appeal to the
Third District, the trial court order extending comity to the Hague decision was af-
firmed. Id. For a criticism of the Third District's resolution of Nahar, see Andrew
Reiss, Note, The Impact of Nahar v. Nahar on Comity in Florida: It's Just Not Fun-
ny Anymore, 27 U. MiAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 203 (1995).
144. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 229 (citations omitted).
145. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale et al. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the
Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987).
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ations underlying both laws.'" Such analysis should consider
the foreign interests, the interests of the forum jurisdiction, and
the "mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning
international legal regime." " 7 Where a foreign jurisdiction's
law could apply to an action, the forum will consider which juris-
diction's policy interests will be advanced more by the applica-
tion of their law. Typically, a forum will apply a conflicting for-
eign law so long as that law does not contravene a clear policy of
the forum jurisdiction."'
In the early case of Canada Southern Railroad Company v.
Gebhard,"' the U.S. Supreme Court gave effect to a Canadian
bankruptcy law that conflicted with the U.S. principle of free-
dom of contract. The Court determined that the U.S. citizens
had entered into a contract with an entity governed by foreign
law, and that they "impliedly subject[ed] [themselves] to such
laws of the foreign government." 50 Florida courts have applied
foreign law to contract disputes where the contract entered into
force under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction.' In fact, Florida
courts must apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction applicable
under the forum's choice of law rules'52 unless that law contra-
146. Id.
147. Id. The Court further explained:
Choice-of-law decisions similarly reflect the needs of the system as a
whole as well as the concerns of the forums with an interest in the
controversy. "Probably the most important function of choice-of-law rules
is to make the interstate and international systems work well.
Choice-of-law rules, among other things, should seek to further harmoni-
ous relations between states and to facilitate commercial intercourse
between them. In formulating rules of choice of law, a state should have
regard for the needs and policies of other states and of the community of
states."
Id. note 11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, §6, cmt. d, p. 13
(1971)).
148. See id.; Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d
507 (Fla. 1981).
149. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
150. Id.
151. See Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507
(Fla. 1981) (upholding a "choice of law provision designating foreign law in an inter-
state loan contract which calls for interest prohibited as usury under Florida law
but supportable under the chosen foreign law."); In Re Estate of Santos, 648 So. 2d
277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (applying law of New York to enforce contractual
provisions that would be usurious under Florida law).
152. Florida has adopted the rational significant relationships test, as set forth
in the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law, Sections 145-46 (1971) to determine
the applicable law where there exists a conflict between the law of the forum and a
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venes a clear public policy of the state." Florida courts consid-
er the interest of the foreign sovereign in determining whether
an extension of comity is proper."
In Kroitoro v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 5 the court
applied Panamanian bankruptcy law to a suit brought by a
Panamanian debtor against his U.S. trustee in bankruptcy. The
court found that the bankruptcy laws of Panama, though differ-
ent from those of the United States, did not offend any policy of
the U.S. or the state of Florida and therefore principles of comity
suggested application of the foreign law.15
D. Comity and TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes
The Third District Court of Appeal could have recognized
the acts of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court and National Assem-
bly through the doctrine of comity. However, the Advisory Opin-
ion of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court is neither a final judg-
ment nor a non-final order, removing it from the most common
ways in which the doctrine is employed as to foreign judicial
acts. The U.S. Supreme Court established that comity should be
extended where no interest of the forum would suffer as a result
of its extension."' In TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes, the interest of
the forum may be served by extending comity to the Advisory
Opinion. Given the difficulty of interpreting the codes and laws
of Nicaragua, the Advisory Opinion may have proved useful in
assisting the court in its resolution of the case, as it offers a
clear, unambiguous interpretation of Nicaraguan damages law.
This informative character, however, does not account for
the missing jurisdictional and representational aspects of the
Advisory Opinion. Florida courts will not grant comity to a judi-
cial act where the parties did not have notice and opportunity to
foreign law. Under that approach, the place of the wrong is no longer determinative.
See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981).
153. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Ring Power Corp., 450 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984).
154. Gustafson v. Jenson, 515 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
155. 522 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
156. Id.; see also Wilkinson v. Manpower, Inc. 531 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1976).
157. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
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be heard."s Even under the broadened notion of comity as
stated in Nahar v. Nahar,5 9 the Supreme Court of Nicaragua
still lacked original jurisdiction over the matter. Additionally it
is unlikely that the parties had notice and opportunity to be
heard, a procedural necessity for the extension of comity."6
The Third District Court of Appeal could have granted rec-
ognition to the Authentic Interpretation without concern for the
jurisdictional and notice problems associated with the Advisory
Opinion. Florida has a clear policy of extending comity to appli-
cable foreign law where such extension would not interfere with
the public policy of Florida.'
In TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes, the Authentic Interpretation
constitutes a clear legal expression of Nicaraguan damage law,
by which the parties agreed to be bound. There is harmony be-
tween the Florida wrongful death statute and the damage policy
underlying the Authentic Interpretation.'62 In fact, the Florida
Supreme Court indicated in Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp." that Florida's policy on wrongful death disfavors en-
forcement of foreign statutory damage limitations in wrongful
death actions." In that case, the Court declined to enforce the
lex loci delicti, Illinois wrongful death limitation, because it was
contrary to Florida public policy.'65
Conversely, there is an apparent tension between the issu-
ance of the Authentic Interpretation and the general U.S. policy
of prohibiting the legislature from "prescrib[ing] rules of deci-
sion" in cases pending before the courts.'6 The Authentic In-
158. Nahar, 656 So. 2d at 229.
159. Id. at 225.
160. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 166-67.
161. See Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507
(Fla. 1981); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.
1981); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); Kroitoro v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 522 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1987); Wilkinson v.
Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1976).
162. FLA_ STAT. § 768.19 (1995).
163. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 747.
166. Memorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 706 F.2d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing
U.S. v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872)). See also U.S. v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212
(11th Cir. 1995). There is also a policy prohibiting the legislature from commanding
the judiciary to reopen final judgments, as such a command would interfere with
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terpretation could thus be perceived as an improper attempt to
dictate the outcome of the appeal pending before the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal.
Another contrasting policy compels a court to apply a new
law which intervenes between judgment and appeal. 67 If the
Authentic Interpretation was issued to clarify an ambiguity in
Nicaraguan damage law revealed by the Third District Court of
Appeal's analysis, then it constituted an intervening law which
the Court would have to apply under general principles of U.S.
jurisprudence and comity. If, however, the Authentic Interpre-
tation was an improper attempt to dictate the outcome of the
appeal, then principles of U.S. jurisprudence clearly prohibit the
recognition and enforcement of that law.
E. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine as established in Underhill v.
Hernandez," comprehends that the "courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of another, done within its own
territory."" The U.S. Supreme Court established that the
proper redress for acts of a foreign sovereign lies with the politi-
cal branches of the U.S. government.7 This doctrine was ex-
panded in a line of cases dealing mostly with the expropriation
of property.' The fundamental notion of the doctrine appears
judicial independence. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
167. Memorial Hosp., 706 F.2d at 1137 ("Until appellate rights are exhausted,
even an otherwise valid judgment may be negated by supervening legislation.");
American Intl Group, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 657 F.2d 430, 442 (citing U.S. v. The
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103) ('[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before
the decision of the appellate court a law intervenes and positively changes the rule
which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied."); DeRodulfa v.
U.S., 461 F.2d 1240, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("but in great national concerns . . . the
court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a
judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of
law, the judgment must be set aside."); see also 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta,
331 U.S. 795 (1947) (modifying 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199
(1947) (on June 16, 1947, the Supreme Court remanded the case originally decided
on May 5, 1947, to the District Court for consideration of issues raised by the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-263, approved May 14, 1947).
168. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
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in the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law:
In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, courts in the United
States will generally refrain from examining the validity of a
taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory,
or from sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental
character done by a foreign state within its own territory and
applicable there.172
The application of this principle to the case under consid-
eration would effectively bar a U.S. court from considering the
motives of the Supreme Court and National Assembly of Nicara-
gua in promulgating their respective acts. There may be a ques-
tion as to the applicability of this federal common law doctrine
to the courts of the several states. However, the Supreme Court
in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., Int'1173 indicated that the states were in fact bound: "The
act of state doctrine is not some vague doctrine of abstention but
a 'principle of decision binding on federal and state courts
alike." 74 Justice Scalia, writing for the court, continued, "[a]ct
of state issues only arise when a court must decide - that is,
when the outcome of the case turns upon - the effect of official
action by a foreign sovereign."175 The outcome in TAN-SAHSA
v. de Brenes certainly turned upon the validity of the Nicara-
guan government's acts, for if valid, they indicate that moral
damages were recoverable under Nicaraguan law and the
plaintiffs were thus entitled to an additional three million dol-
lars.
The act of state doctrine operates in conjunction with comi-
ty, in a sense forcing the U.S. court to give effect to the acts of
the Nicaraguan sovereign. 76 It extends to intangible property,
even though the situs of that property may be difficult to ascer-
tain.
177
(1976); First Natl City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
172. RESTATEMENT (THaD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 443(1) (1986).
173. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
174. Id. at 406 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427).
175. Id. at 406.
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 172, report-
er's note 1.
177. Id. reporter's note 4.
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A concurrent principle, known as the public judgments doc-
trine,"' may preclude giving effect to the Advisory Opin-
ion.179 This doctrine reflects the general unwillingness of U.S.
courts to give effect to public law judgments s° of foreign
courts.'81 The doctrine also results from a reluctance to scruti-
nize the judicial acts of a foreign sovereign. Under the public
judgments doctrine, as contrasted with the act of state doctrine,
the reluctance to scrutinize usually results in nonrecognition of
the foreign judicial act. s2 Neither the act of state doctrine nor
the public judgments doctrine would preclude a U.S. court from
giving effect to the Authentic Interpretation.
F. Certification of Questions of Law
Since the landmark Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," federal
courts have frequently been compelled to resolve issues by ap-
plying the law of the state in which they sit. In cases involving
an unsettled or unclear issue of state law, federal courts have
relied upon the abstention doctrine to avoid answering a ques-
tion."8 Under this doctrine, litigants would then file for a de-
claratory judgment in state court, appeal to the supreme court
in that jurisdiction, and then return to the federal court where
they originally filed. 1" The Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act of 1967 enables federal courts to certify determina-
tive questions of state law to that state's supreme court."s
Florida recognizes this procedure' and permits a court to cer-
178. Id. reporter's note 10.
179. Id.
180. These generally deal with penal, fiscal or other public law matters. See id.
181. Id. reporter's note 10.
182. Id.
183. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
184. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908); United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
185. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
186. UNIF. CERT. QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1967). For a discus-
sion of certification generally, see John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional
Certification and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411 (1988); Brian Mattis, Certifi-
cation of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal
Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969).
187. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150; Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (1961).
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tify a question either sua sponte or by motion of a party.1"
Once the question has been certified, the parties then submit
briefs on their positions to the deciding state court."9
Perhaps it would have been possible for the Third District
Court of Appeal to certify the question of whether moral damag-
es may be recovered under Nicaraguan law to the courts of Nica-
ragua. This would allow the parties to file briefs arguing their
positions as well as providing an authoritative ruling on a dis-
puted aspect of Nicaraguan law. This would have resulted in an
Advisory Opinion issued upon consideration of the arguments
and interpretations of both parties. Such a procedure tends to
allay the fears of most courts granting comity to foreign deci-
sions as the parties would be granted both notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. 9 °
Some critics of the certification procedure frown upon the
issuance of advisory opinions; others point to difficulty in proper-
ly formulating the question.'9 ' Furthermore, practical difficul-
ties U.S. courts encounter in dealing with alien law would make
an international certification process difficult to manage. Such
problems include language barriers, '92 differences in legal
traditions,'93 and limited access to foreign legal materials.'
It is less practical for a U.S. court to await a decision by a for-
eign court on an unsettled aspect of law than for a federal court
to await a state court ruling. In the international context, U.S.
courts lack the constitutional and federalist incentives to respect
the role of foreign law and foreign legal institutions. Yet many of
these reasons also justify a policy of deferring to the determina-
tions made by the legal institutions that are created by the law
they interpret. TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes exemplifies this prob-
lem, and indicates that perhaps the courts of Florida should
looks to the legislature and courts of Nicaragua as the true ex-
perts on Nicaraguan law.
188. FLA. R. App. P. 9.150(a).
189. Id.
190. See Nahar v. Nahar, 656 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
191. Corr & Robbins, supra note 186, at 423.
192. John C. McKenzie & Antonio Rosas Sarabia, The Pleading and Proof of
Alien Law, 30 TUL. L. REV. 353 (1956).
193. For a discussion of the difference between the common law and civil law
traditions, see MERRYMAN, supra note 42.
194. STERN, supra note 99.
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V. CONCLUSION
TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes presented a unique combination
of political and legal issues, which made it an unusually compli-
cated case. Even the most basic understanding of Nicaraguan
law proved daunting. Aside from the obvious language barrier,
relatively few common law attorneys fully comprehend the civil
law foundation of the Nicaraguan legal system. Unfortunately,
the court did not address the case to the fullest extent possible,
making it difficult to criticize its legal reasoning. In its very
brief opinion, the court took judicial notice of Nicaraguan law
and decided that moral damages were not recoverable under
Article 2509 of the Civil Code. There was no indication of the
extent to which the court researched Nicaraguan law beyond the
information presented by the parties. The court gave no indica-
tion as to whether it was troubled by the Advisory Opinion or
Authentic Interpretation. The paucity of explanation in the opin-
ion probably makes this decision a poor precedent for future
cases.
Perhaps the timing of the pronouncements emanating from
the Nicaraguan institutions caused the court to consider their
reliability suspect. It is quite possible that the Nicaraguan Su-
preme Court and National Assembly acted to influence the out-
come of pending litigation. It may also be that the court's failure
to address the legal declarations was a thinly-veiled attempt to
avoid a consideration of their validity altogether. If the court
had taken up the issue of the motivation behind the Nicaraguan
acts, it would have been required to decide the issue in a pub-
lished opinion. This would have left the court in the awkward
position of either giving effect to the potentially questionable
acts of a foreign sovereign or explaining in writing that it did
not find such acts trustworthy. This is certainly an unenviable
position, given the foreign policy ramifications of such a determi-
nation.
However, notions of comity and self-determination require a
U.S. court to respect a foreign country's right to determine its
own laws. In TAN-SAHSA v. de Brenes, the court's silence as to
the Advisory Opinion and Authentic Interpretation effectively
denied Nicaragua the right of legal self-determination. Though
193
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the proclamations may have been suspect, U.S. courts are not
the proper forum for determination of that issue. Had the Third
District Court of Appeal viewed the Authentic Interpretation as
an impermissible attempt to dictate the outcome of a pending
case, the Court should have clearly articulated the U.S. v. Klein
policy of judicial independence and declined recognition on the
basis of public policy. At minimum, such treatment would leave
no room for interpreting that the Court considered itself more
qualified to determine Nicaragua's laws than that nation's own
legal institutions. Respect for a nation's legal institutions and
laws provides the foundation of the relationship between two
nation-states. This principle must also guide the courts as they
consider issues of foreign law, foreign politics, and foreign liti-
gants.
WILLIAM H. WHITE, JR.*
VI. APPENDIX A**
ADVISORY OPINION OF THE NICARAGUAN SUPREME COURT OF
JUSTICE, OCT. 5, 1993
CERTIFICATE
The undersigned Secretary of the Honorable Supreme Court
of Justice hereby certifies the inquiry included herein and says
verbatim the following:
Managua, October 5, 1992. Doctor Germdn Vasquez C.,
Chief Judge of the Criminal Court. Managua. Dear Judge
Vasquez.
In a letter dated 8-20-92, you inquire as to the following:
"Whether under the laws of Nicaragua only material damages
are recoverable, or if moral damages are also, in accordance with
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, University of Miami School of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor Keith S. Rosenn for his guidance and criticism; Professor
Bernard H. Oxman for his advice; Felicity A. McGrath for her patience and encour-
agement; and William H. White and Ann B. White for their love and support.
** The appendices are provided for the reader's convenience. All translations
are by the author; the original Spanish is reproduced verbatim.
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Article 46 of the Penal Code. And with the end of determining
who may claim indemnification for such damages, whether it is
understood that this right corresponds with the people that have
the right to ask for support from the injured, in accordance with
the Civil Code, pursuant to the precepts in Article 48 of the
Penal Code and Article 288 of the Civil Code."
I have received instructions from the Judges of the Supreme
Court of Justice to respond in the following manner:
The Civil Code of Nicaragua, in Articles 2509, et seq., es-
tablishes civil liability for damages in their totality, without
exclusion, which is to say that it encompasses material damages
as well as moral damages. There exists no provision in the law
referring to damages which limits them to strictly material dam-
ages, and that excludes moral damages. For a more in-depth
explanation of this subject, see judgment date 9-28-1956, case
Obando vs. Cia. El6ctrica de Granada, and judgment date 8-12-
1965, case Burgos Chamorro vs. Ferrocarril del Pacifico de Nica-
ragua.
The Nicaraguan Civil Code, in the chapter referring to
delicts and quasi-delicts, establishes civil liability for damages
caused by a punishable act, and in Article 3106 C.Civ. it says
that civil liability for a public transportation accident will al-
ways be governed by the Criminal Code.
Article 2 of the Penal Code sets out as punishable, the act
described and punished by law, caused by imprudence, lack of
skill, negligence or violation of laws or regulations; and that any
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. (Article 34 C.Pen.).
The Penal Code of Nicaragua, in the chapter on Rules to
determine Civil Liability, in Article 46, requires the payment of
material and moral damages caused by a punishable act. Ma-
terial and moral damages may be demanded pursuant to Arti-
cles 46 and 48 of the Penal Code, by those people that have a
right to demand food according to Article 288 of the Civil Code.
Article 10, C. Pen., indicates that a damaging act or omis-
sion by an agent for whose actions a person is responsible, by
virtue of a civil relationship binding him to such agent, consti-
tutes a quasi-delict. Civil liability proceeding from a quasi-delict
is not extinguished as a consequence of a dismissal of the crimi-
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nal liability of an agent. Said civil liability may be attributed [to
the principal for] material damages as well as moral damages.
See the cases of Engracia Martinez vs. Rafael Cabrera & Co.,
judgment date 12-21-1957; Vivas vs. Esso Standard Oil, judg-
ment date 8-17-1949; Cuadra Mendoza vs. Camilo Barberena
Deshon & Co., judgment date 12-9-1969.
This is in reply to your inquiry. Alfonso Valle Pastora. Sec-
retary. Supreme Court of Justice.
Let it also be recorded that the judgment issued by the
Supreme Court of Justice, in this case, does not contain a dis-
senting vote because the opinion was issued by unanimous vote
of all the Magistrates, Judges Orlando Trejos Somarriba, Orlan-
do Corrales Mejia, Rafael Chamorro Mora, Ram6n Romero
Alonso, Alba Luz Ramos Vanegas, Rodrigo Reyes Portocarrero,
Enrique Villagra Morales, Santiago Rivas Haslam, Adrian
Valdivia Rodriguez.
At the request of Doctor Alvaro Ramirez Gonzalez, this was
issued in the City of Managua, on the ninth day of December,
nineteen hundred and ninety-two.
[Signed by Alfonso Valle Pastora, Secretary, Supreme Court of
Justice].
CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA
CERTIFICACI6N
El infrascrito Secretario de la Excelentisima Corte Suprema
de Justicia certifica que la consulta que integra y literalmente
dice:
Managua, 05 de Octubre de 1992. Doctor German VAsquez
C. Juez Primero de Distrito del Crimen, Managua. Estimado
Doctor VAsquez.
En nota del 20-08-92, consulta Ud., lo siguiente: "Que si son
demandables bajo las leyes de Nicaragua solamente los dafios
materiales, o si tambidn lo son los dafios morales de acuerdo con
lo establecido en el Arto. 46 del C6digo Penal. Y si para los
efectos de determinar quienes pueden reclamar la indemnizaci6n
de tales dafios se entiende que les corresponde ese derecho a las
personas que tienen derecho a pedir alimentos al ofendido
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conforme el C6digo Civil, segdn lo preceptuado en el Arto. 48 del
C6digo Penal y en el Arto. 288 del C6digo Civil."
He recibido instrucciones de los sefiores Magistrados de la
Corte Suprema de Justicia, para responder de la forma
siguiente:
El C6digo Civil de Nicaragua en sus Artos. 2509 y siguientes
establece la responsabilidad civil por dafios y perjuicios en su
totalidad, sin exclusi6n, es decir, que comprende tanto dafios
materiales como morales. No existe provisi6n alguna de la ley, al
referirse a los dafios y perjuicios que las limite a dafios
estrictamente materiales, que excluya los dafios morales. Para
profundizar sobre el tema ver sentencia del 28-9-1956, caso
Obando de G6mez VS. Cia. El6ctrica de Granada y sentencia del
12-8-1965, caso Burgos Chamorro VS. Ferrocarril del Pacifico de
Nicaragua.
El C6digo Civil Nicaraguense, en el Capitulo referente a los
delitos y los cuasi-delitos [sic] establece la responsabilidad civil
por dafios causados por un hecho punible, y en el Arto. 3106 C.,
se dice que la responsabilidad civil por accidente de transporte
pdblico serd regida siempre por el C6digo Penal.
El Arto. 2 del C6digo Penal, sefiala como punibles el hecho
calificado y penado por la ley, ocasionado por imprudencia,
impericia, negligencia o violaci6n de leyes o reglamento, y toda
persona responsable penalmente, lo es tambi~n civilmente.
(Arto. 34 Pn.).
El C6digo Penal de Nicaragua en su Capitulo sobre Reglas
para Determinar Responsabilidad Civil, en el Arto. 46, estipula
el pago de perjuicios materiales y morales causados por el hecho
punible. Los dafios materiales y morales pueden ser reclamados
conforme los Artos. 46 y 48 Pn., por quienes tienen derecho a
reclamar alimentos segdn el Arto. 288 del C6digo Civil.
El Arto. 10 Pn. indica que constituye cuasi-delito [sic] la
acci6n u omisi6n dafiosa de un agente de cuyos hechos es res-
ponsable una persona en virtud de relaci6n civil que la liga con
dicho agente. La responsabilidad civil proveniente de un cuasi-
delito [sic] no se extingue como consecuencia de un sobresei-
miento por la responsabilidad penal del agente. Dicha
responsabilidad civil es imputable tanto a dafios materiales
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como morales. Ver casos de Engracia Martinez Vs. Rafael Cabre-
ra y Cia. Ltda., sentencia del 21-12-1957; Vivas Vs. Esso Stan-
dard Oil, sentencia del 17-8-1949; Cuadra Mendoza Vs. Camilo
Barberena Deshon & Co., sentencia del 9-12-1969.
Asi queda evacuada su consulta. ALFONSO VALLE PAS-
TORA, SECRETARIO, CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.
Asimismo hace constar que el dictamen emitido por la Corte
Suprema de Justicia, en este caso, no tiene voto contrario pues
la consulta fue evacuada por decisi6n unAnime de todos los seflo-
res Magistrados Doctores Orlando Trejos Somarriba, Orlando
Corrales Mejia, Rafael Chamorro Mora, Ram6n Romero Alonso,
Alba Luz Ramos Vanegas, Rodrigo Reyes Portocarrero, Enrique
Villagra Morales, Santiago Rivas Haslam, Adrian Valdivia
Rodriguez.
A solicitud del Doctor Alvaro Ramirez Gonzalez, extiendo la
presente en la cuidad de Managua, a los nueve dias del mes de
Diciembre [sic] de mil novecientos noventa y dos.
[Firmado por Alfonso Valle Pastora, Secretario, Corte Suprema
de Justicia].
VII. APPENDIX B
LAw No. 157
The National Assembly of the Republic of Nicaragua, in
exercise of its powers, has enacted the following Authentic Inter-
pretation of Articles 2509, 1837, 1838, 1865, and 3106 of the
Civil Code and paragraph 2, Article 1123 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Article 1. Consider the following to be an Authentic Inter-
pretation of Articles 2509, 1837, 1838, 1865, and
3106 of the Civil Code and paragraph 2, Article
1123 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
a) civil liability for damages as referred to in Article 2509
C.Civ., et seq. (Title VIII, Sole Chapter on Delicts and
Quasi-delicts) in its entirety, and without exception, encom-
passes both material as well as moral damages. There exists
no provision in the law whatsoever which limits them to
damages which are strictly material and excludes moral
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damages.
If there were any doubt whatsoever, Article 46 of the Penal
Code of 1974 in setting forth the Rules to Determine Civil
Liability, establishes "... . indemnification for the value of
the material or moral damages" and if there exists any
other disposition contrary to the precept of the Penal Code,
it was expressly or impliedly abrogated by that set forth in
Article 564 of the same Code.
Nevertheless, a review of Nicaraguan legislation reflects
that there does not exist any express disposition in the law
which opposes indemnification for all damages, material or
moral, incurred as a result of a delict or a quasi-delict, eit-
her in the Penal Code or in the Civil Code.
b) the provision set forth in Article 1865 C.Civ. is not appli-
cable to ". . . civil obligations arising out of delicts or misde-
meanors, which are governed by the dispositions of the
Penal Code," as established by Article 1837 C.Civ. nor is it
applicable to obligations arising from "... . acts or omissions
not penalized by law. . . " those which are subject to the
dispositions of Title VIII, Sole Chapter, as contemplated by
Article 1838 C.Civ.
Article 1865 C.Civ. applies only to obligations arising from
other types of contractual actions, debts or matters relating
to property.
c) with respect to Articles 3106 C.Civ. and 1123, paragraph 2)
C. Proc. Civ., in cases of damages arising as a consequence
of an accident involving a public transportation vehicle, the
carrier shall always be liable, without exception, for indem-
nification corresponding to the quasi-delict, as defined in
Article 10 C.Pen., and which in accordance with said norm
only produces civil liability.
With regard to that set forth in said norms, in plain agree-
ment with that established in Article 392 C.C., as a result it
should be deduced that civil liability by public transporta-
tion enterprises arising from a delict or quasi-delict, is not
extinguished as a consequence of a dismissal of the agent's
criminal liability nor by a lack of criminal conviction when
only civil liability is sought.
199
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
This interpretation is also in accord with the precepts of
Article 52 C. Pen. which expressly contemplates the renoun-
cement of the criminal action in favor of the civil [action] in
pursuit of indemnification of damages or reparation of the
harm caused, in the same manner as included in Article
2509 C.Civ., without specifying nor excluding material dam-
ages or moral damages. It does not preclude, therefore, the
civil action in the case of a criminal acquittal or in the case
of a lack of conviction which in the criminal context declares
the responsibility of the accused for such indemnification.
d) In conformance with Articles 46 and 48 C.Pen., material
and moral damages may be sought by those people entitled
to receive food [and support] in conformance with the provi-
sions of the Civil Code and its amendments, according to the
case.
Article 2. The present law shall enter into force upon its
publication in any mass media, without prejudice to
its publication in La Gaceta, Diario Oficial. May it
be published.
Enacted in the City of Managua in the Hall of Sessions of the
National Assembly, this twenty-third day of the Month of
March, Nineteen hundred and ninety-three.
[Signed by Gustavo Tablada Zelaya, President of the National
Assembly, and Francisco J. Duarte, Secretary of the National
Assembly].
LEY No. 157
La Asamblea Nacional de ]a Repilblica de Nicaragua, en uso de
sus facultades, ha dictado la siguiente: Interpretaci6n Aut6ntica
de los Articulos 2509, 1837, 1838, 1865, y 3106 del C6digo Civil
y el No. 2) 1123 del C6digo de Procedimiento Civil.
Arto. 1. T6ngase como interpretaci6n aut6ntica de los Artos.
2509, 1837, 1838, 1865 y 3106 del C6digo Civil y
del numeral 2) del Arto. 1123 del C6digo de Proce-
dimiento Civil, la siguiente:
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a) la responsabilidad civil por dafios y peijuicios a que se refie-
re el Arto. 2509 C. y siguientes (Titulos VIII, Capitulo Unico
sobre Delitos y Cuasidelitos) es en su totalidad, sin exclu-
si6n, comprendiendo tanto dahos materiales como morales.
No existe provisi6n alguna de la ley que las limite a dafios
estrictamente materiales y que excluya los dafios morales.
Por si hubiera alguna duda, el Arto. 46 del C6digo Penal de
1974 al consignar las Reglas para Determinar Responsabili-
dad Civil, establece ". . . la indemnizaci6n por el valor del
perjuicio material o moral" y, de existir cualquier otra dispo-
sici6n que se opusiere a este precepto de C6digo Penal, fue
expresa o tAcitamente derogada por lo dispuesto en el Arto.
564 del mismo C6digo.
No obstante, una revisi6n actualizada de la legislaci6n
nicaraguense refleja que no existe ninguna disposici6n ex-
presa de la ley que se oponga a la indemnizaci6n por todos
los dafios, materiales o morales, ocasionados por un delito o
cuasidelito contemplado en el C6digo Penal o en el C6digo
Civil.
b) lo dispuesto en el Arto. 1865 C. no es aplicable a ... las
obligaciones civiles que nacen de los delitos o faltas, que se
regirdn por las disposiciones del C6digo Penal," como lo
establece el Arto. 1837 C. y tampoco es aplicable a las
obligaciones que se derivan de "... actos u omisiones en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia no penadas por la ley... "
las que se someten a las disposiciones de Titulo VII, Capitu-
lo Unico, como lo preceptdia el Arto. 1838 C.
El Arto. 1865 C. se aplica solamente a las obligaciones que
nacen de otro tipo de actos contractuales, deudas o asuntos
relativos a la propiedad.
c) respecto a los Artos. 3106 C. y 1123 Pr. numeral 2), en los
casos de dafios ocasionados como consecuencia de un acci-
dente de un vehiculo de transporte piblico, el portador serA
siempre responsable, sin excepci6n, por la indemnizaci6n
correspondiente al cuasidelito, definido en el Arto. 10 Pn., y
que al tenor de dicha norma s6lo produce responsabilidad
civil.
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De lo dispuesto en dichas normas, en plena coincidencia con
lo establecido en el Arto. 392 C.C., debe en consecuencia
colegirse que responsabilidad civil de las empresas pdiblicas
de transporte proveniente de un delito o cuasidelito, no se
extingue como consecuencia de un sobreseimiento por la
responsabilidad penal del agente ni ain por la falta de un
encauzamiento criminal cuando s6lo se demanda por la
responsabilidad civil.
Esta interpretaci6n es ademds coincidente con lo
preceptuado por el Arto. 52 Pn. que contempla expresamen-
te la renuncia de la acci6n criminal para intentar s6lo la
civil en las gestiones para la indemnizaci6n de dafios y per-
juicios o reparaci6n del dafio causado, en la misma forma
inclusiva del Arto. 2509 C., sin especificar ni excluir dafios
materiales o morales. No precluye, por tanto, la acci6n civil
en caso de una sentencia absolutoria en lo penal o a falta de
una sentencia condenatoria que en lo criminal declare la
responsabilidad del culpable para tales indemnizaciones.
ch) Conforme los Artos. 46 y 48 Pn., estdn legitimadas para
reclamar los dafios materiales y morales, las personas con
derechos a reclamar alimentos conforme las prevenciones
pertinentes del C6digo Civil y sus reformas, segdn el caso.
Arto. 2. La presente ley entrard en vigencia a partir de su
publicaci6n por cualquier medio de comunicaci6n masi-
vo, sin perjuicio de su publicaci6n en La Gaceta, Diario
Oficial. Publiquese.
Dado en la Ciudad de Managua en la Sala de Sesiones de la
Asamblea Nacional, a los vientres dias del mes de marzo de mil
novecientos noventa y tres.
[Firmado por Gustavo Tablada Zelaya, Presidente de la
Asamblea Nacional, y Francisco J. Duarte, Secretario de la
Asamblea Nacional].
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